Trump Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: October

President Donald Trump’s September summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the White House produced the modest, marketable results the relationship can currently bear. The two leaders operationalized new trade and investment boards, advanced tariff relief for $30 billion in “non-sensitive” goods in each direction, and kept talks alive on rare earths, agriculture, and commercial access. Those steps may preserve predictability at the top, but they do not amount to a superpower reset. The rivalry over technology, Taiwan, supply chains, and Iran remains largely unresolved.

Iran is the clearest test. Trump and Ambassador David Perdue said Washington warned Beijing that direct or indirect Chinese support for Tehran is “totally unacceptable.” That message matters, but the administration has also downplayed reports that Chinese entities provided satellite support to Iran and has avoided sanctioning major Chinese banks, refiners, or commercial nodes tied to Iranian oil flows. Beijing appears to be offering assurances while preserving the networks that help Tehran absorb U.S. pressure.

The summit therefore looks less like strategic stability than managed stalemate. Trump can strike tactical deals with Xi, and some could be worth having if China follows through on soybean purchases and resumes rare-earth flows to U.S. companies. But promises are not performance. Purchases will show up in trade data, rare-earth shipments can be tracked, and Chinese support for Iran can be punished or tolerated. If deadlines slip and commitments go unmet, Trump will know China is not playing along; it is playing him.

In September, the Trump administration belatedly began addressing cyber resilience shortfalls. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is beginning to rebuild its workforce, with Acting Director Nick Andersen reporting the agency has made offers to 250 new hires. Likewise, after previously cutting CISA’s robust election security efforts, the Department of Homeland Security released its 2026 Election Infrastructure Security plan and announced the creation of a real-time threat-sharing platform. With less than six weeks before the midterms, however, it is unclear how effective this new platform will be.

Meanwhile, on September 9, the FBI unveiled its first public Cyber Strategy, prioritizing faster disruption operations and expanding external partnerships. To that end, the FBI supported Dutch partners in the arrest of a hacker affiliated with the ShinyHunters criminal group. The FBI and ShinyHunters are now in a public spat. The FBI confirmed it is investigating a “major” breach of its systems after ShinyHunters claimed to have stolen sensitive data on “nearly all” bureau personnel. FBI Assistant Director Brett Leatherman warned the remaining members of ShinyHunters, “We know how to find you.”

Finally, despite a string of incidents involving rogue AI agents hacking organizations and calls from frontier labs for greater AI safety, the administration had largely refused to discuss greater government oversight. On September 29, however, the White House announced a voluntary commitment from companies to strengthen internal security and industry security standards. Simultaneously, however, Washington allegedly pressured Anthropic to block the United Kingdom’s AI Security Institute from assessing its newest model.

The United States continued its naval blockade against Iran in September, redirecting more than 35 commercial vessels. In retaliation for attempted Iranian naval strikes, American forces struck at least 10 Iranian oil tankers in early September. International shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remained subject to intermittent attack by Iranian forces, but oil exports through the Strait have increased.

The Pentagon inspector general released a report on Operation Epic Fury on September 14. The report confirmed “strategic inventory shortfalls” in munitions and “industrial base bottlenecks.” Delays in congressional appropriations continue to exacerbate these challenges.

The Pentagon confirmed for the first time on September 14 that the U.S. military has deployed “space control weapons” on orbit. Russia and China are rapidly developing space and counter-space capabilities, underscoring the need for continued U.S. investment in space.

The United States, Denmark, and Greenland signed a deal on September 22 that largely restates defense arrangements already in place. Its modest gains could have been secured through respectful diplomacy with an ally rather than coercion better suited to an adversary — and without damaging NATO cohesion.

As the Pentagon’s Europe Force Posture Review continues, conflicting reports emerged regarding the expected decision. These included potentially pulling a significant number of U.S. forces from Europe and establishing a new U.S. Army base in Poland. A U.S. military unit is reportedly rotating into Lithuania after the deployment there lapsed amid other U.S. withdrawals from Europe. Meanwhile, Russian sabotage and aerial incursion campaigns are escalating.

Seeking to revive Ukraine peace talks, President Trump dispatched envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and — for the first time — Kyiv in early September. Trump also spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and later met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the UN General Assembly. U.S. and Russian officials likewise held further discussions in New York and Washington, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio announcing that Trump had invited Putin to the upcoming G20 summit in Miami.

Although trilateral talks may resume in the coming weeks, the Kremlin has made clear it has no intention to halt the bloodshed absent Ukrainian capitulation. For now, the Trump administration and Kyiv hope to achieve a more modest truce that would bar strikes on energy infrastructure and Black Sea shipping. Ukraine is eager to reopen its exports and to safeguard its power grid ahead of what looks likely to be its hardest winter yet. Trump, concerned about rising diesel prices, wants Ukraine to stop attacking Russian refineries.

While Washington insists Russia is open to the truce, Moscow seems to remain resistant. That may be because Putin believes Russia can deliver “much more painful and much more destructive” blows than Ukraine, which is desperately short on defenses against ballistic missiles.

If Ukraine could blunt Russian strike capabilities, such a truce might become more attractive to Moscow. Trump could help by asking his friend Elon Musk to let Ukraine use SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet service to hunt for launchers inside Russian territory.

President Trump’s meeting with a dozen Middle Eastern nations was a savvy diplomatic move offset only by the competing visions of these countries. America’s national interests are best served by choosing the hawkish view.

Qatar, and implicitly Turkey, advocated for a collective security partnership integrating Iran as a partner. This flawed proposal omitted demands for behavioral reform regarding Tehran’s proxy networks while simultaneously calling for punitive actions against Israel.

For its part, Saudi Arabia’s view contradicts Qatar’s by attributing regional instability to flagrant Iranian attacks against national infrastructure. Riyadh asserted that stability could not be achieved through premature pacts, prioritizing immediate deescalation backed by hard deterrence.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has progressively pivoted toward an uncompromising defensive posture. Sharing Riyadh’s security concerns, Abu Dhabi’s diplomacy has escalated against Tehran, starting with the severing of diplomatic ties, followed by the cutting of all trade ties, and — in September — the suspension of flights.

The United Arab Emirates also disagreed with Qatar’s appeasement of Iran, arguing that Iran is inherently incapable of committing to deescalation while it actively threatens Gulf shipping and critical infrastructure.

By rejecting premature diplomacy, Abu Dhabi’s hawkish realignment provides Washington a realistic blueprint. This robust posture allows the United States to maintain ironclad security commitments, enforce freedom of navigation, and deploy the unyielding pressure necessary to force Tehran to end its chronic regional belligerence.

September showed that Indo-Pacific strategy cannot rest on summitry alone. Ahead of President Trump’s meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Japanese and South Korean counterparts in New York and reaffirmed U.S. defense commitments to both allies. The three governments also announced support for Taiwan’s participation in international fora and a new trilateral mechanism for economic security and technology cooperation. That was the right signal before Trump hosted Xi at the White House.

But the administration’s handling of U.S.-South Korea military exercises cut against that reassurance. In August, Trump ordered a substantial reduction in joint drills with Seoul, citing cost and his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The allies shortened Ulchi Freedom Shield from 11 days to five and scaled back some field training. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro warned in September that China could exploit reductions in U.S.-South Korea exercises. He had a point: Readiness concessions made for diplomatic atmospherics can weaken deterrence beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The administration did take useful steps elsewhere. Washington and Canberra pledged $580 million to support Pacific Island nations, including U.S. funding for fuel storage and grid stability and Australian support for surveillance and law enforcement. Those investments help answer China’s influence campaign in the Pacific. But money and communiqués cannot substitute for consistent reassurance. Indo-Pacific deterrence depends on allies seeing U.S. commitments, exercises, and regional investments moving in the same direction. Beijing will watch that alignment more closely than any summit statement.

The United States paid a total of $827 million to the United Nations on September 16, reducing its debt to the world body by about one-fifth. The sum was split between $725 million for the UN regular budget and $102 million for peacekeeping operations, with the remaining debt calculated at $4.2 billion. Historically the largest single funder of the United Nations, America — under the Trump administration — has made its financial contributions contingent on additional reforms, including trimming benefits for UN staff, overhauling the UN pension system, and reducing or eliminating open-ended peacekeeping missions. The United Nations has implemented some reforms — for example, cutting the number of posts by 21 percent and reviewing its pension fund — but the wholesale changes demanded by Washington have yet to materialize.

President Trump addressed the annual UN General Assembly, which held its high-level debate from September 22 to 28. The president reiterated his commitment to ensuring that the regime in Tehran is prevented from developing a nuclear weapon. He described Iran’s leaders as the world’s main sponsors of terrorism and defended the U.S. decision to launch military action against the regime.

On Gaza, as the Board of Peace met on the sidelines of the General Assembly, Trump praised the Security Council for endorsing his 20-point plan for the enclave. Trump also took aim at the International Criminal Court, labeling it an “anti-American tribunal” and calling on member states who have joined it to “officially resign from this rogue institution immediately.”

President Trump rejected a seven-day ceasefire proposal from Iran that would have included opening the Strait of Hormuz and returning to nuclear negotiations. President Trump said on September 27 that he expects talks to resume but that additional strikes are a possibility. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on September 27 that Iran has only 15 million barrels of oil on vessels outside the strait, which it sells to China, and will likely run out within two weeks. The regime is unable to export more oil under the U.S. blockade. Meanwhile, Secretary Bessent said that American efforts have enabled an average of 15-22 million barrels per day to move through the Strait of Hormuz.

Under Operation Economic Outcast, Treasury designated a Turkish bank and its subsidiaries, a Russian financial institution, and an Iranian digital assets exchange controlled by financier Babak Zanjani, as well as the exchange’s developer and three Zanjani associates. These entities and individuals were involved in illicit finance and sanctions evasion for the regime. Treasury also sanctioned networks connected to Lebanese Hezbollah and Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy in Iraq.

Treasury designated 27 Iranian airlines and sanctioned companies in third countries servicing Mahan Air, which Washington sanctioned in 2011. The threat of secondary sanctions led regional countries to suspend Iranian flights.

While the Iran war has been at a relative simmer, the economic and political war against Israel has been heating up. On September 8, Canada and 11 European countries, including the United Kingdom, jointly announced their intention to introduce restrictions on trade with Israeli communities in the West Bank, prompting Israeli countermeasures against London. A diplomatic row has since erupted between Israel and the Netherlands after Dutch sanctions on West Bank goods took effect in late September. The Trump administration, meanwhile, has watched silently as its European partners escalate their economic campaign against Israel.

Not to be outdone, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights added 61 entities to (and removed five from) its list of Israel-linked entities operating in “occupied Palestinian territory” — Israel is the only country subject to a UN blacklist of companies operating in a disputed territory.

Signaling fissures in the administration’s support for Israel, Vice President JD Vance stated that the United States “cannot let our Middle Eastern foreign policy be subservient to the State of Israel” — remarks that echo antisemitic tropes. On the other hand, the Trump administration is reportedly planning to sell $2.8 billion in arms to Israel — a major boon for Israel’s defense.

The Trump administration has also bolstered Israeli regional security by convening a trilateral U.S.-Israel-Morocco meeting and a separate Abraham Accords meeting that included new member Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the Board of Peace unveiled a $2.45 billion plan for the next six months of rehabilitating Gaza. But as ever, Gaza reconstruction remains dependent on Hamas’s elusive surrender.

The United States and South Korea eased trade tensions and continued negotiating over economic and security responsibilities.

On September 18, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, urging Seoul to speed up its $350 billion investment commitment in U.S. infrastructure and discussing a larger South Korean role in the Strait of Hormuz. Cho said Seoul would consider doing more to contribute to maritime security, though South Korean President Lee Jae Myung set limits that same day on Seoul’s potential role in the Middle East. On September 22, Seoul confirmed a $22.3 billion gas-fired power plant in Texas as the first project under the commitment.

North Korea continued testing missiles in September despite President Trump’s decision to scale back joint drills with Seoul in August as a goodwill gesture toward Pyongyang. On September 21, President Lee urged Washington to ease sanctions on North Korea in exchange for a freeze on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles development. At the UN General Assembly the next day, Lee pledged Seoul would help “lay the groundwork” for resuming U.S.-North Korea talks.

Trump told Lee separately that he remained open to dialogue with Pyongyang. Given President Lee’s repeated push to revive summit talks with Pyongyang, that reassurance bolsters the political trust undergirding the U.S.-South Korea alliance. However, President Trump rightly declined Lee’s call to ease sanctions. Pyongyang’s continued missile tests show the threat has not diminished, and premature sanctions relief would squander the alliance’s leverage over North Korea.

September widened the gap between U.S. pressure on Hezbollah and Beirut’s implementation of Washington’s June 26 Israel-Lebanon framework. U.S. mediation helped secure Israel’s September 4 release of Lebanese detainees, while U.S. Ambassador Michel Issa discussed preparations for another Israeli-Lebanese negotiating round and continued support for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Washington also intensified financial pressure. On September 10, Treasury sanctioned Lebanese financiers, couriers, and businesses it said moved hundreds of millions of dollars from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force to Hezbollah through cash, gold, and exchange networks.

Yet the framework’s central mechanism stalled. The next Rome negotiating round was postponed until October. On September 9, the LAF said it had established checkpoints and patrols in three pilot areas and confiscated 1,818 weapons — overwhelmingly small arms rounds — and munitions and did not identify them as Hezbollah materiel; residential searches required owners’ consent.

Likewise, the LAF claimed Israeli attacks were obstructing further deployment, though the framework ties phased Israeli withdrawal to verifiable Lebanese action establishing exclusive state control and dismantling Hezbollah’s military presence nationwide. Israel, meanwhile, reported destroying more than two kilometers of Hezbollah tunnels on the Ali al-Taher ridge containing rockets, missiles, drones, anti-tank weapons, explosives, and a Badr Unit command complex.

President Trump praised President Joseph Aoun’s leadership, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on September 28. Neither engagement produced a timetable, another pilot-zone handover, or verified Hezbollah disarmament. Washington thus kept meaningful financial and diplomatic pressure on Hezbollah, but September produced little additional Lebanese implementation.

Saudi Arabia has not ruled out pursuing nuclear weapons, according to an intelligence finding submitted to Congress alongside a proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement. The assessment is significant because the deal contemplates building a U.S. uranium enrichment facility on Saudi soil without the most rigorous international inspections. The ability to produce nuclear fuel gives states the option to fuel reactors or build nuclear weapons.

On September 14, four Democratic senators introduced a joint resolution of disapproval. Unless Congress can assemble a veto-proof two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate to block the deal — a remote prospect — it will likely take effect sometime between late November and mid-December. However, Congress may later add conditions to make the deal’s implementation more difficult.

Meanwhile, during the UN General Assembly in New York the week of September 21, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States and Iran held indirect talks aimed at restarting a stalled diplomatic agreement covering Tehran’s nuclear program and its hostile actions in the Strait of Hormuz. The talks are unlikely to succeed before the U.S. midterm elections, however, as Iran waits for a sign that a Democratic victory could force an end to the war on terms favorable to Tehran — such as allowing it to keep its stockpiles of enriched uranium currently entombed in destroyed sites, rebuilding the ability to enrich uranium and fabricate nuclear weapons, blocking access for international inspectors, and maintaining subterranean nuclear facilities like Pickaxe Mountain.

The Trump administration continued efforts in September to move military space maneuverability from concept to operational capability and to expand collaboration with U.S. allies. During Apollo Maneuvers 2026, U.S. Space Command conducted its first live-fly exercise, coordinating real spacecraft movements across multiple orbits while testing how U.S., allied, and commercial operators can sustain and protect space capabilities in a contested environment.

The Pentagon also deepened cooperation with U.S. allies in space while expanding communications and surveillance capabilities supporting U.S.-led military operations. The department signed an agreement with 10 international partners who collectively agreed to contribute $302 million toward a new U.S.-led allied military satellite communications network. Separately, the Space Force selected Texas as the final site of a U.S.-UK-Australia radar network designed to continuously track objects in high orbit.

In addition, the State Department launched the Space Catalyst Partnership to deepen civil and commercial space cooperation with countries that have signed the Artemis Accords, a voluntary set of principles regarding civil exploration and use of space. The initiative will connect partner countries with U.S. space technology and companies.

Finally, the administration for the first time acknowledged U.S. military capabilities in orbit. On September 14, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink confirmed that the United States has “on-orbit space control weapons” capable of defending U.S. forces against hostile actions. Meink did not disclose specifics but noted that hardware for Golden Dome’s planned space-based missile interceptors had progressed to flight-ready systems in less than a year.

The U.S. government marked the 25th anniversary of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks with the usual ceremonies and reminiscences, but the Trump administration has now deprioritized combating the global jihadist movement relative to other national and international security issues. This carries obvious risk at a time when both the Islamic State and al-Qaeda show resilience and enduring operational ambition.

It remains to be seen whether there was a Sunni jihadist component to the just-disrupted plot against RAF Fairford, a base used by U.S. forces in Gloucestershire, England. Given the continued presence of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iran, the West could face a Tehran-facilitated al-Qaeda attack, a possibility that cannot yet be ruled out in the Fairford case.

In this context, U.S. policy toward the ISIS core area of Syria and Iraq continues to show an element of complacency about any future threat from Sunni jihadism in those countries. In Syria, Washington has continued its policy of treating the de facto government as no longer involved in terrorism, most recently by lifting sanctions on Mustafa Farag, a high-ranking cleric within the al-Nusra Front. In Iraq, the U.S.-led military coalition formally withdrew by late September, thus relying on Baghdad and Damascus to manage the residual ISIS threat.

Since President Trump lifted Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in August, Washington-Damascus engagement has focused largely on economic issues. During his visit to New York for the annual UN General Assembly session, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa met with members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and representatives of American companies to discuss investment opportunities in Syria. The meeting came after a major U.S. economic delegation representing 50 companies visited Damascus on September 13 and 14.

Despite sanctions relief and increased foreign investment, Syria’s economic situation has remained volatile. Protests erupted across several parts of the country in mid-September after fuel prices rose. While foreign direct investment has boosted economic activity and raised expectations of future growth, the benefits have yet to translate into meaningful improvements in living conditions for the average Syrian household.

Before Sharaa visited New York, Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shaibani, to discuss regional security, increased cooperation, integrating Syria’s minority communities, and Damascus’s engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Syria has signaled that it intends to place newly discovered nuclear material under IAEA safeguards as part of a prospective civilian nuclear program. But this could bring risks. Despite the international support Damascus is receiving, Syria remains far from stable. Turkey seeks to deepen its military entrenchment in the country, while radical elements remain embedded in its security apparatus.

The U.S. Treasury Department showed that pressure could sway Ankara. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Turkish Golden Global Bank and two related companies on September 4 for moving tens of millions of dollars through accounts linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Turkey responded by revoking the Istanbul operating license of Bank Mellat, a major Iranian lender. Additionally, Turkish Airlines, AJet, and Pegasus Airlines suspended all flights to Iran until 2027. Meanwhile, Iranian carrier Mahan Air ceased flying to Turkey starting on September 21. Ankara is trying to avoid secondary sanctions rather than confront Tehran.

However, U.S. enforcement subsequently stopped. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that every Iranian airline would be grounded worldwide by September 23, but from September 23 to 27, 12 U.S.-sanctioned Iranian carriers, including Iran Air, Caspian Airlines, and Meraj Air, operated at least 83 flights into Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. On September 8, Washington had designated eight of the 12 carriers as part of Operation Economic Outcast.

FUGO, a Turkish ground handler, has service agreements with at least eight of the airlines sanctioned before and after September 8 but has faced no penalty, even though Washington warns that providing material support to these airlines risks sanctions exposure.

Washington has not used all of the tools in its arsenal. Treasury should sanction FUGO under Executive Order 13902 and make an example of Turkish companies. It should also tie any further sanctions relief and F-35 concessions to actual enforcement Ankara can demonstrate, not just promises.