IAEA Refers Iran’s Nuclear File to UN Security Council

In the first such action in 20 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Board of Governors voted to refer Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for possible countermeasures.

The vote passed with 23 in favor, three against, and eight abstentions. China, Russia, and Niger opposed the resolution. An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the IAEA’s 35-nation Board of Governors is required to pass a resolution.  

At the UNSC, Beijing and Moscow are not expected to support new penalties against Iran, such as sanctions. Even so, the IAEA action sends a clear political message: irrespective of U.S. and Israeli military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and the ongoing conflict, Iran is still required to meet its IAEA safeguards commitments.

Limited IAEA Access for More Than a Year

Iran prompted IAEA action after more than a year of restricting inspectors’ access to most of its 22 nuclear sites and one associated facility, in violation of its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran continues to permit, at Russia’s insistence, IAEA verification at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. It allowed access to several non-targeted sites until late 2025 but permitted verification at only one of them. It has since halted those visits.

Tehran has also failed to report the status of nuclear material affected by military strikes. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told the board on September 7, “It is more than a year since the Agency lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the previously declared inventories of [low-enriched uranium] and [highly enriched uranium] enriched up to 60% U-235 at the declared nuclear facilities affected by the military attacks of June 2025.”

Iran’s more than 9,000 kilograms of enriched uranium remain inaccessible at the Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan sites, and the regime is not believed to have recovered it. Whether the stocks survived the strikes is not known. U.S. President Donald Trump has said the United States is closely monitoring those facilities, as well as a newer site under construction at Pickaxe Mountain, and may take additional military action if needed.

Iran has argued that safety concerns at the destroyed sites, ongoing hostilities, and the lack of a U.S.-Iran deal setting terms for restored IAEA access prevent it from allowing inspectors back in — arguments the IAEA has rejected as legally invalid.

No Progress on Outstanding Safeguards Issues

Iran has also refused for several years to provide information the IAEA needs to close a longstanding probe into the regime’s past undeclared use of nuclear material and suspect activities at undeclared facilities. This failure prompted detailed IAEA reporting in May 2025 and a board resolution in June 2025, followed by later resolutions in November 2025 and June 2026 that detailed Iran’s refusal of IAEA access and its failure to report on the status of nuclear material.

The June 2025 resolution, adopted just before the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, noted that “despite…resolutions by the Board and numerous opportunities provided by the Director General since 2019, Iran has failed to provide the co-operation required under its Safeguards Agreement, impeding Agency verification activities, sanitizing locations, and repeatedly failing to provide the Agency with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at several undeclared locations in Iran or information on the current location(s) of nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment.”

A Stark Warning on Nonproliferation Violations

U.S. and Israeli military strikes against Tehran prevented it from obtaining nuclear weapons and destroyed much of the regime’s enrichment and weaponization capabilities. Iran now has a chance to change course and meet its nonproliferation commitments.

Iran should restore IAEA access without delay and report on the status of its nuclear material. It should stop blocking the IAEA’s investigation into its past military nuclear work and provide clear answers.

In the absence of Tehran’s cooperation, the United States should continue the naval blockade and Operation Economic Outcast and thereby force the regime to make hard choices about funding proliferation efforts in the future.

Andrea Stricker is a research fellow and deputy director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from the author and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow Andrea on X @StrickerNonpro. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.